I received the QAR response from Potomac Consolidated TRACON today. Essentially, when the Restricted Area South of Manassas is hot and Dulles is landing north, this creates an operational problem for PCT. As such, they would prefer that no one follow the route we intended to fly, even remaining below the Dulles Class B.
I protested that Class E airspace is for everyone. The sentiment of the QAR representative was that we were better off and that PCT provided us a service that was in our best interest as well. It was further suggested that had we continued into the ADIZ along the intended route, we could have created a workload issue because of the number of point outs needed to IFR aircraft on Dulles final. In turn, that could have made it necessary to stop servicing ADIZ requests. The QAR will be reminding controllers not to issue headings to VFR aircraft, but frankly I was glad that we were given exact instructions.
The good news is that since the FAA will now be acting PIC for any flight into or out of the ADIZ that I make, I am thinking that maybe I don't have to meet currency requirements or carry my license.
Tuesday, December 13, 2005
Sunday, December 04, 2005
Post Holly Run... A-Foul
Yesterday, December 3rd was the annual Holly Run to Tangier Island (TGI). Jason, Robby and I stopped for fuel, lunch and to meet a friend at Hummel (W75). We also filed our VFR ADIZ flight plan. We took off and flew up the Northern Neck at 2500’ to stay under the 40 knot winds aloft.
Approaching BRV, our filed entry point, we contacted Potomac Approach to obtain our squawk code. We had been having difficulty raising Potomac because the Garmins were over-autosquelching ATC communications and apparently we were too low to get through. When we finally got through after trying three frequencies, we were swicthed to the correct frequency (which was not the one published). We were 6nm southeast from BRV. We continued northbound to enter the ADIZ.
We had planned to fly east of the MOA and restricted areas, above Quantico at 3000, continue north and then northwest under the outer ring of the class B, and south of Manassas (HEF).
We were then instructed that the Restricted Area 6608 was hot and that Dulles was landing north, and that we were to fly west of the Restricted area. The original intention had been to request a BARIN1 STAR transition at 2500 feet. Given the pre-emptive instructions, I knew intuitively that request was going to be rejected.
I replied that we intended to fly east of the restricted area, remain below the Class Bravo and over fly Manassas.
(See graphic of the flight plan.)
The controller responded that we were to “Turn to a heading of 300, remain west of the restricted area, Dulles is landing north and there are too many airplanes in the vicinity of Manassas … you are aren’t going to over fly Manassas.”
At that point I made the command decision that any continued discussion on the plan was not in anyone’s best interest. I replied, “Turning left 300, wilco.” There would be time to hash this out in a more appropriate venue. We flew through the MOA, which is something I prefer to avoid as well, but we were given a heading we were going to fly it.
I contemplated having the tape marked, but the controller was also dealing with an aircraft south of Stafford with Mode C problems and who apparently needed recurrent IFR training to refresh his understanding of procedures and IFR communication protocols. I didn’t see any point in further exacerbating the situation – I noted the time and frequency and we continued the flight.
Approaching BRV, our filed entry point, we contacted Potomac Approach to obtain our squawk code. We had been having difficulty raising Potomac because the Garmins were over-autosquelching ATC communications and apparently we were too low to get through. When we finally got through after trying three frequencies, we were swicthed to the correct frequency (which was not the one published). We were 6nm southeast from BRV. We continued northbound to enter the ADIZ.
We had planned to fly east of the MOA and restricted areas, above Quantico at 3000, continue north and then northwest under the outer ring of the class B, and south of Manassas (HEF).
We were then instructed that the Restricted Area 6608 was hot and that Dulles was landing north, and that we were to fly west of the Restricted area. The original intention had been to request a BARIN1 STAR transition at 2500 feet. Given the pre-emptive instructions, I knew intuitively that request was going to be rejected.
I replied that we intended to fly east of the restricted area, remain below the Class Bravo and over fly Manassas.
(See graphic of the flight plan.)
The controller responded that we were to “Turn to a heading of 300, remain west of the restricted area, Dulles is landing north and there are too many airplanes in the vicinity of Manassas … you are aren’t going to over fly Manassas.”
At that point I made the command decision that any continued discussion on the plan was not in anyone’s best interest. I replied, “Turning left 300, wilco.” There would be time to hash this out in a more appropriate venue. We flew through the MOA, which is something I prefer to avoid as well, but we were given a heading we were going to fly it.
I contemplated having the tape marked, but the controller was also dealing with an aircraft south of Stafford with Mode C problems and who apparently needed recurrent IFR training to refresh his understanding of procedures and IFR communication protocols. I didn’t see any point in further exacerbating the situation – I noted the time and frequency and we continued the flight.
Wednesday, October 12, 2005
When is 120 faster than 600???
The bigger one might be able to go non-stop for 24 hours, but for flights to locations 750 miles or less, the tortoise beats the hare with no 21-day booking penalty.
;)
;)
(Photo Courtesy of AOPA)
The aircraft was photographed with a Cessna 182 owned by the Boeing Employee Flying Association in preparation for an upcoming article in AOPA Pilot.
Tuesday, October 11, 2005
Just keep thinking that ... this won't hurt a bit
Regarding the Federal preparedness for a new pandemic of Avian flu, The Washington Post editors wrote today:
It was disturbing to hear the president ruminate on the use of
military troops for mass quarantines. That comment -- conjuring images of
soldiers shooting as sick people try to cross a cordon sanitaire -- could have
been a scare tactic.
In fact, there is no legal, let alone ethical, means of
enforcing mass quarantine in this country....
For those of us that fly (well try to) near DC, we know better. The rule of law and democratic principles have been usurped by a simple sentiment: where there's a will, there's a way.
Sunday, October 09, 2005
The ADIZ is wrong for democracy and freedom
Oppose the erosion of democratic principles. Oppose the ADIZ!
Keep America free.
Saturday, October 08, 2005
Response to the DOT NPRM FAA-2003-17005
October 8, 2005
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20591
RE: Docket No. FAA-2003-17005, Wash, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area
On 4 August 2005, the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) "to codify current flight restrictions for certain aircraft operations in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area." The NPRM requests comments from interested parties. As a resident, pilot, voter and employee of a flight school in the region, as well as a member of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) and a volunteer Angel Flight pilot, I feel particularly compelled to comment on the NPRM.
My considered opinion is that the assertions and justifications provided in the NPRM do not satisfactorily substantiate an overwhelming need for the expense and drastic actions being suggested. In summary, the NPRM fails to acknowledge or consider that the facts presented consist of out-dated information – most of the content can be traced to information available in the 2003 timeframe – or that the analysis of the threat profile as perceived by the DoD and DHS of general aviation aircraft is exceedingly narrow, and thin, with no cost/benefit discussion whatsoever. This response analyzes the core justifications offered by the FAA in the NPRM.
1) DC is home to all three branches of the Federal government, as well as numerous Federal buildings, foreign embassies, multi-national institutions, and national monuments
Yes, the United States is a “federal” government. As such, there are elements and components represented in every state of the Union, which is representative of the institutional strength and resiliency that such a form of government offers. Moreover, we know from the attacks of 11 September 2001 that Washington, DC is not the only city that the terrorists assign a high value. Without trying to speculate where those other locations might be, no one except the terrorists can really know the values that might be assigned to any number of high profile buildings, memorials and locations within the entire United States. For example, recent bombings in Egypt occurred in resort communities far away from the seat of government there. Thus, the formation of a permanent ADIZ for Washington, DC will lead the way, and become the model for, additional implementations nationwide.
To enact this NPRM is to support directly the objectives of the original 2001 terrorists at an intangible cost to liberty… and upwardly spiraling costs to taxpayers and users of the National Airspace System (NAS). In fact, the NPRM notes that the deterrent value provided in the security protocols in place for Part 121 operations might encourage the terrorists to consider general aviation aircraft to use in an attack. This is consistent with the belief that the terrorist mentality is to select targets they believe will have the largest psychological impact with the least amount of operational risk. As such, the ADIZ/FRZ airspace construct might actually encourage the terrorists to attack so-called “softer” or less defended targets. The Government should consider the tactical advantages of discontinuing the ADIZ to let the terrorists mistakenly believe that an attack on DC can be successful.
2) There is a need for continued vigilance in aviation security.
There is no question that vigilance is necessary. The terrorists leveraged outdated and lackadaisical protocols in commercial transport security operations to carry out the September 11th attacks. That said, the FAA notes that there really is “no evidence” to support more drastic security protocols like the ADIZ/FRZ. Moreover, just as Waleed bin Attash was apprehended on the ground with explosives in Pakistan, the DHS should be called upon to justify why it is that Americans cannot reasonably expect similar results for thwarting such plots through U.S. law enforcement initiatives and awareness efforts in the U.S. aviation community. If the answer is that these initiatives are inadequate and do not serve as inherent and significant operational risks to terrorist plots trying to use light aircraft for terrorist purposes, then that needs to be explained and/or corrected.
Please note that the cost just to the FAA of the NPRM is estimated at $11M, while the Airport Watch initiative is being funded nationwide with just $275,000. The cost/benefit ratio of these two programs should be studied. I would suggest that the disparity in the benefit of each dollar spent between the two efforts will be staggering. On the surface, one program covers the whole country including Alaska and Hawaii, and one covers a relatively small geographic region at a much higher expense.
I also submit that the $296M cost estimated in the NPRM for the ADIZ/FRZ would be better spent to supplement what can only be reasonably concluded as inadequately capable law enforcement initiatives and awareness efforts rather than continue the ADIZ/FRZ. Awareness efforts and initiatives like Airport Watch are a significant and cost-effective deterrent to such plots because of the uncertainty of success that they create for terrorists.
As noted in recent ADIZ/FRZ violations involving a pilot from Pennsylvania, a governor from Kentucky, and a flock of birds on April 27, 2005, the “temporary” airspace restrictions actually create results that terrorists consider successful at no cost to them! Summarily, it is now established through these incidents that the existence and enforcement of the ADIZ airspace will create permanently an ongoing source of panic, chaos, disruption, and other unforeseeable safety issues in addition to economic distortions to the underlying NAS infrastructure (i.e., airports). The effects on cost and safety are incalculable while the security benefit is negligible. In four years, there has yet to be one successful intercept of a terrorist anywhere in the nation or over DC; yet the residents of the DC metropolitan region have been “terrorized” by the flare dropping F-16s and other fast moving, loud and dangerous, low altitude intercept aircraft. The DOT proposes to make this security posture a permanent reality, but the NPRM never mentions these issues?
Furthermore, since 2001 subsequent terror attacks launched by al Qaeda around the world have not used any form of aircraft. Recent bombings in Spain, Egypt and England have used more traditional forms of ground-based attacks. This is tangible fact, and not speculation about how the terrorists might attack next. In fact, despite the success of the attack on the USS Cole prior to the September 11th attacks, the Department of Transportation has made no provision even remotely similar to this NPRM to address similar threats on rivers and ports within the vicinity of Washington, DC. Before the NPRM is approved, this needs to be explained. Have not rental trucks proven to be highly effective conveyances for terrorist weapon delivery in New York and Oklahoma? What has been done to fingerprint and identify drivers of these vehicles, and log every trip conducted by them since these incidents took place? The myopic, over-analysis of the threat posed by small aircraft must end. It is needlessly diverting resources from considering more likely attack profiles for the next incident. This NPRM should be not be enacted in favor of the presumption of innocence standard – a right that all Americans are supposed to enjoy equally.
Finally on this point, the GAO found that the “FAA has not established written policies or procedures for reviewing and revalidating the need for flight restrictions that limit access to airspace for indefinite periods of time and could negatively affect the general aviation industry.” As such, once enacted, the costs of the ADIZ will be born in perpetuity by American taxpayers and the aviation industry even if it provides no benefit.
3) While the DHS has no specific information that terrorist groups are currently planning to use general aviation (GA) aircraft to perpetrate attacks against the U.S., it remains concerned that (in light of completed and ongoing security enhancements for commercial aircraft and airports) terrorists may turn to GA as an alternative method for conducting operations.
First, this argument is reminiscent of the infamous “white van” of the 2002 DC Sniper attacks. In that case, considerable law enforcement resources were utilized to detain and inspect thousands of “white” vans, which later proved irrelevant to the investigation. Just as finding the white van had no bearing on locating the snipers and preventing further terror and loss of life, the continuation of the DC ADIZ and prohibitions on GA aircraft operations in the ADIZ/FRZ will not prevent terrorists from achieving their objectives. In fact, the ADIZ is an ongoing terrorist success because they have affected a change in our behavior as a result of their actions.
Should the NPRM be approved, I would hope then the we’ll start looking for “missing red fire trucks” again. That was another risk profile broadcast publicly in the aftermath of September 11th.
Moreover, the ability of the Intelligence community to prove the validity of its assertions and conclusions is not without reproach. Specifically prior to moving forward with this NPRM, the FAA and DOT must consider whether or not the threat estimate regarding general aviation aircraft is any more accurate than the 2002-2003 analysis that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. If DHS is unable to provide or share substantive and irrefutable information with DOT that a substantiated threat (not a risk) exists, this NPRM should not go forward.
Finally, the November 2004 GAO Report to the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives says it best, “Additionally, industry and TSA officials stated that the small size, lack of fuel capacity, and minimal destructive power of most general aviation aircraft make them unattractive to terrorists and, thereby, reduce the possibility of threat associated with their misuse.”
The NPRM for creating the ADIZ continues to perpetuate the search for the “boogeyman in a small plane” despite documented assessments by the Government that small aircraft are not a threat.
4) One area that the FAA does not address in the NPRM is the cost to upgrade inadequate radar facilities. At the moment, the radar coverage available to the FAA is not capable of the task created by the NPRM. Moreover, neither the costs to flight operations for GA aircraft in the ADIZ to comply with the limitation of the radar facilities nor the cost to upgrade these facilities to address the issue is addressed in the NPRM. I have specifically been instructed by ATC to avoid such facility deficiencies (e.g., below 3000 AGL SW of EMI VOR and below 5000 AGL SW of CSN VOR) in flights through the ADIZ. The costs to upgrade and enhance radar facilities on an accelerated timeline must be forthrightly produced and considered.
5) Ongoing and recurrent training expenses for both pilots and controllers are another cost element not considered in the NPRM. This cost may have been addressed beneath other costs, or omitted. It is unclear which is the case.
In summary, it is important to note that the American Bald Eagle is the greatest American symbol of freedom. The freedom that flight affords is a significant component of that symbol. By this comment to the NPRM, I implore the DOT and FAA to consider the needs of all Americans to allow those who have earned the privilege to fly in the NAS to be able to exercise those privileges free from unnecessary encumbrances that provide little, if any, security value. The airspace around Washington, DC is a critical component of the NAS, supporting the busiest and most economically significant aircraft operations anywhere in the world.
Making the ADIZ/FRZ construct permanent provides nothing more than a false sense of security at a substantial cost to freedom and national heritage that is totally unquantifiable and antithetical to America’s founding principles.
Finally on September 20, 2001, President Bush said, “It is my hope that in the months and years ahead, life will return almost to normal. We'll go back to our lives and routines, and that is good.” Unfortunately, this NPRM codifies an ADIZ that represents nothing close to a“return almost to normal.” The NPRM is inconsistent with the President’s stated vision and should be withdrawn. The costs of implementation and enforcement are considerable and dire, while no one can quantify any actual benefits. The impact on lives and routines dependent upon aviation activities is quantifiable to an extent, and they are outrageous in the fact of no quantifiable benefit achieved. The Administrator should exercise statutory authority to rescind this NPRM and retire the ADIZ/FRZ without any further delay.
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20591
RE: Docket No. FAA-2003-17005, Wash, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area
On 4 August 2005, the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) "to codify current flight restrictions for certain aircraft operations in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area." The NPRM requests comments from interested parties. As a resident, pilot, voter and employee of a flight school in the region, as well as a member of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) and a volunteer Angel Flight pilot, I feel particularly compelled to comment on the NPRM.
My considered opinion is that the assertions and justifications provided in the NPRM do not satisfactorily substantiate an overwhelming need for the expense and drastic actions being suggested. In summary, the NPRM fails to acknowledge or consider that the facts presented consist of out-dated information – most of the content can be traced to information available in the 2003 timeframe – or that the analysis of the threat profile as perceived by the DoD and DHS of general aviation aircraft is exceedingly narrow, and thin, with no cost/benefit discussion whatsoever. This response analyzes the core justifications offered by the FAA in the NPRM.
1) DC is home to all three branches of the Federal government, as well as numerous Federal buildings, foreign embassies, multi-national institutions, and national monuments
Yes, the United States is a “federal” government. As such, there are elements and components represented in every state of the Union, which is representative of the institutional strength and resiliency that such a form of government offers. Moreover, we know from the attacks of 11 September 2001 that Washington, DC is not the only city that the terrorists assign a high value. Without trying to speculate where those other locations might be, no one except the terrorists can really know the values that might be assigned to any number of high profile buildings, memorials and locations within the entire United States. For example, recent bombings in Egypt occurred in resort communities far away from the seat of government there. Thus, the formation of a permanent ADIZ for Washington, DC will lead the way, and become the model for, additional implementations nationwide.
To enact this NPRM is to support directly the objectives of the original 2001 terrorists at an intangible cost to liberty… and upwardly spiraling costs to taxpayers and users of the National Airspace System (NAS). In fact, the NPRM notes that the deterrent value provided in the security protocols in place for Part 121 operations might encourage the terrorists to consider general aviation aircraft to use in an attack. This is consistent with the belief that the terrorist mentality is to select targets they believe will have the largest psychological impact with the least amount of operational risk. As such, the ADIZ/FRZ airspace construct might actually encourage the terrorists to attack so-called “softer” or less defended targets. The Government should consider the tactical advantages of discontinuing the ADIZ to let the terrorists mistakenly believe that an attack on DC can be successful.
2) There is a need for continued vigilance in aviation security.
There is no question that vigilance is necessary. The terrorists leveraged outdated and lackadaisical protocols in commercial transport security operations to carry out the September 11th attacks. That said, the FAA notes that there really is “no evidence” to support more drastic security protocols like the ADIZ/FRZ. Moreover, just as Waleed bin Attash was apprehended on the ground with explosives in Pakistan, the DHS should be called upon to justify why it is that Americans cannot reasonably expect similar results for thwarting such plots through U.S. law enforcement initiatives and awareness efforts in the U.S. aviation community. If the answer is that these initiatives are inadequate and do not serve as inherent and significant operational risks to terrorist plots trying to use light aircraft for terrorist purposes, then that needs to be explained and/or corrected.
Please note that the cost just to the FAA of the NPRM is estimated at $11M, while the Airport Watch initiative is being funded nationwide with just $275,000. The cost/benefit ratio of these two programs should be studied. I would suggest that the disparity in the benefit of each dollar spent between the two efforts will be staggering. On the surface, one program covers the whole country including Alaska and Hawaii, and one covers a relatively small geographic region at a much higher expense.
I also submit that the $296M cost estimated in the NPRM for the ADIZ/FRZ would be better spent to supplement what can only be reasonably concluded as inadequately capable law enforcement initiatives and awareness efforts rather than continue the ADIZ/FRZ. Awareness efforts and initiatives like Airport Watch are a significant and cost-effective deterrent to such plots because of the uncertainty of success that they create for terrorists.
As noted in recent ADIZ/FRZ violations involving a pilot from Pennsylvania, a governor from Kentucky, and a flock of birds on April 27, 2005, the “temporary” airspace restrictions actually create results that terrorists consider successful at no cost to them! Summarily, it is now established through these incidents that the existence and enforcement of the ADIZ airspace will create permanently an ongoing source of panic, chaos, disruption, and other unforeseeable safety issues in addition to economic distortions to the underlying NAS infrastructure (i.e., airports). The effects on cost and safety are incalculable while the security benefit is negligible. In four years, there has yet to be one successful intercept of a terrorist anywhere in the nation or over DC; yet the residents of the DC metropolitan region have been “terrorized” by the flare dropping F-16s and other fast moving, loud and dangerous, low altitude intercept aircraft. The DOT proposes to make this security posture a permanent reality, but the NPRM never mentions these issues?
Furthermore, since 2001 subsequent terror attacks launched by al Qaeda around the world have not used any form of aircraft. Recent bombings in Spain, Egypt and England have used more traditional forms of ground-based attacks. This is tangible fact, and not speculation about how the terrorists might attack next. In fact, despite the success of the attack on the USS Cole prior to the September 11th attacks, the Department of Transportation has made no provision even remotely similar to this NPRM to address similar threats on rivers and ports within the vicinity of Washington, DC. Before the NPRM is approved, this needs to be explained. Have not rental trucks proven to be highly effective conveyances for terrorist weapon delivery in New York and Oklahoma? What has been done to fingerprint and identify drivers of these vehicles, and log every trip conducted by them since these incidents took place? The myopic, over-analysis of the threat posed by small aircraft must end. It is needlessly diverting resources from considering more likely attack profiles for the next incident. This NPRM should be not be enacted in favor of the presumption of innocence standard – a right that all Americans are supposed to enjoy equally.
Finally on this point, the GAO found that the “FAA has not established written policies or procedures for reviewing and revalidating the need for flight restrictions that limit access to airspace for indefinite periods of time and could negatively affect the general aviation industry.” As such, once enacted, the costs of the ADIZ will be born in perpetuity by American taxpayers and the aviation industry even if it provides no benefit.
3) While the DHS has no specific information that terrorist groups are currently planning to use general aviation (GA) aircraft to perpetrate attacks against the U.S., it remains concerned that (in light of completed and ongoing security enhancements for commercial aircraft and airports) terrorists may turn to GA as an alternative method for conducting operations.
First, this argument is reminiscent of the infamous “white van” of the 2002 DC Sniper attacks. In that case, considerable law enforcement resources were utilized to detain and inspect thousands of “white” vans, which later proved irrelevant to the investigation. Just as finding the white van had no bearing on locating the snipers and preventing further terror and loss of life, the continuation of the DC ADIZ and prohibitions on GA aircraft operations in the ADIZ/FRZ will not prevent terrorists from achieving their objectives. In fact, the ADIZ is an ongoing terrorist success because they have affected a change in our behavior as a result of their actions.
Should the NPRM be approved, I would hope then the we’ll start looking for “missing red fire trucks” again. That was another risk profile broadcast publicly in the aftermath of September 11th.
Moreover, the ability of the Intelligence community to prove the validity of its assertions and conclusions is not without reproach. Specifically prior to moving forward with this NPRM, the FAA and DOT must consider whether or not the threat estimate regarding general aviation aircraft is any more accurate than the 2002-2003 analysis that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. If DHS is unable to provide or share substantive and irrefutable information with DOT that a substantiated threat (not a risk) exists, this NPRM should not go forward.
Finally, the November 2004 GAO Report to the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives says it best, “Additionally, industry and TSA officials stated that the small size, lack of fuel capacity, and minimal destructive power of most general aviation aircraft make them unattractive to terrorists and, thereby, reduce the possibility of threat associated with their misuse.”
The NPRM for creating the ADIZ continues to perpetuate the search for the “boogeyman in a small plane” despite documented assessments by the Government that small aircraft are not a threat.
4) One area that the FAA does not address in the NPRM is the cost to upgrade inadequate radar facilities. At the moment, the radar coverage available to the FAA is not capable of the task created by the NPRM. Moreover, neither the costs to flight operations for GA aircraft in the ADIZ to comply with the limitation of the radar facilities nor the cost to upgrade these facilities to address the issue is addressed in the NPRM. I have specifically been instructed by ATC to avoid such facility deficiencies (e.g., below 3000 AGL SW of EMI VOR and below 5000 AGL SW of CSN VOR) in flights through the ADIZ. The costs to upgrade and enhance radar facilities on an accelerated timeline must be forthrightly produced and considered.
5) Ongoing and recurrent training expenses for both pilots and controllers are another cost element not considered in the NPRM. This cost may have been addressed beneath other costs, or omitted. It is unclear which is the case.
In summary, it is important to note that the American Bald Eagle is the greatest American symbol of freedom. The freedom that flight affords is a significant component of that symbol. By this comment to the NPRM, I implore the DOT and FAA to consider the needs of all Americans to allow those who have earned the privilege to fly in the NAS to be able to exercise those privileges free from unnecessary encumbrances that provide little, if any, security value. The airspace around Washington, DC is a critical component of the NAS, supporting the busiest and most economically significant aircraft operations anywhere in the world.
Making the ADIZ/FRZ construct permanent provides nothing more than a false sense of security at a substantial cost to freedom and national heritage that is totally unquantifiable and antithetical to America’s founding principles.
Finally on September 20, 2001, President Bush said, “It is my hope that in the months and years ahead, life will return almost to normal. We'll go back to our lives and routines, and that is good.” Unfortunately, this NPRM codifies an ADIZ that represents nothing close to a“return almost to normal.” The NPRM is inconsistent with the President’s stated vision and should be withdrawn. The costs of implementation and enforcement are considerable and dire, while no one can quantify any actual benefits. The impact on lives and routines dependent upon aviation activities is quantifiable to an extent, and they are outrageous in the fact of no quantifiable benefit achieved. The Administrator should exercise statutory authority to rescind this NPRM and retire the ADIZ/FRZ without any further delay.
Saturday, September 24, 2005
Flying in Relief
(Photo captured the night before landfall, courtesy of the 
NHC)
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina ...
a group of health care professionals and pilots out of Atlanta called Operation Brother's Keeper formed to help bring relief to the homeless and stranded. This group was offering to transport families out of the destruction area to temporary housing offered by Vacation Rentals for Families. Considering my commercial pilot qualifications, I saw a way to use that skill to help. I signed up on the web page; the call to fly a mission came on Saturday morning, September 10th.
Working for a flight school, there are numerous resources available to choose from to make this flight. Considering that I do not personally own an airplane, I contact acquaintances that have access to airplanes that meet the mission requirements. My first call was to John Tabor, who has a share in a Cessna 182. Even though it is not a twin engine airplane, which was the preferred platform requested by the group, it is a more sufficient airplane for the mission at hand than the other training aircraft I normally fly. Upon calling John I learned that he had also signed up with OBK and had been waiting for a call that had not come yet. We decided to check with the logistic officers (spouses) for any un-considered issues and start formulating a plan. Having cleared the initial hurdles, we planned to leave that Saturday evening.
Departing Leesburg, John is ready. So am I.
John's parents live thirty miles outside of Augusta on the way to Atlanta, so overnight accommodations became a non-factor. John's parents live just three miles from the airport, which demonstrates the incredible flexibility and convenience that 5000 airports provide to the general aviation pilot. We left Leesburg, VA (JYO), made a planned stop in Concord, NC (JQF)at the two-hour mark for fuel and charts, and then flew to Wrens, GA (65J) to overnight there.
(View ahead over SW Virginia; there is not a cloud in the sky. One word: HAZE!)
Upon arriving and transferring meager luggage to the car left graciously by John's sister, we drive to the house and settle in for the night. The requisite 20 minutes of TWC (The Weather Channel) was absorbed, and then it was off to bed for an early Sunday morning. Despite the haze of the day before, the weather was looking good, and we awoke just after 6am to a beautiful, almost-autumn-like day.
(Sunrise over the wings - a busy day ahead.)
We were wheels up for the quick 50 minute, 109 mile flight to Dekalb (PDK) just before 8. About 15 miles from PDK, we were cleared for the VOR/DME RWY 27 circling 2R approach and switched to the tower before entering the procedure turn. We were instructed to make right traffic for runway 2R.
(Final approach to PDK).
Established on the ¾ mile final, we were asked to sidestep to 2L. John made that look easy.
(Short final)
Taxiing up to the staging area on the west ramp, we were greeted by the assignment coordinator and other pilots. We soon learned that the plan of the day was in development and that trucks with aid supplies would be arriving on the ramp mid-morning. Following a quick run to grab some post-flight breakfast we took some time to plan, assess fuel status, and get the plane ready for cargo. At 10:15 the truck arrived full of children's clothing, which works well for us since weight would end up being no factor, only space was the determining factor.
(Loaded.)
By just after 11, we were taxiing to depart for Hammond, LA, number 4 for takeoff. After a couple of quick vectors to the west, Atlanta approach cleared us direct to Hammond (HDC), which was fabulous - a 350NM great circle "straight" line. The flight was long enough to actually watch the GPS provide the DTK information to stay on the circle. Curiously, it wasn't until after we were cleared direct that the controller asked us where the airport was. Once we clarified it was in Louisiana, everything was quiet as we climbed up to 8000 feet. Prior to handoff to the next sector, the Atlanta controller took a moment to ask if we were taking supplies, and we replied that we had a full load of kids' clothes. The controller responded with his sincere “…thanks for all that you guys are doing to help out” and switched us to the Center frequency.
Considering the somewhat extra workload that slow GA airplanes add to a controllers' day, those words are high praise indeed.
As we get closer to Hammond, the haze starts to break and the blue tarps and scattered trees start to become visible as we descend. There is a temporary tower set up at Hammond and we report inbound 9NM NE.
(Final RWy 18; Army helo guards the fuel farm.)
After landing on RWY 18, we follow instructions to the west ramp. We see some familiar airplanes and decide where to park. In a few minutes, the truck and people to unload us gather around. The National guard provides some much appreciated bottled water for us. We are quickly unloaded and look to find out what is planned, or being planned for the rest of the day.
(Unloaded)
Now 2:30pm Central time. Other posts by pilots cover the next few two hours fairly well. The trip is a screaming success so far. At this point though, there are no passengers to take northeastward. After an hour of watching the call-a-thon to determine if any shelter has anyone in need of transport, I pick up the Angel Flight literature, which is right next to the Red Cross Hurricane Preparedness tri-fold brochure - how ironic. I call the number on the brochure at 3:20 pm CT on this Sunday, and someone answered the phone. I explained that we, and a whole bunch of assets were on the ground in Hammond, and wanted to know if there was anything that we could be used to do.
After about a half-dozen calls back and forth, I am informed that there is a mission from Naval Air Station Meridian, MS (NMM) to Birmingham, AL (BHM) to transport one person from the MASH unit to facilities in Birmingham. I am briefed for the mission and we start making plans to go. For those not familiar, it is rare to have permission to fly into a military facility, but our flight will use call sign "Angel-Flight-Seven-One-Romeo."
5:00pm, CT. Gas, flight plans, we are soon departing HDC RWY 18 for a northbound trek to NMM. After we climb out, we contact New Orleans departure to request and activate the IFR flight for NGF71R. Once again, we are cleared direct, and the GPS is programmed for the 90 minute flight. Meridian approach requests confirmation that we intend to make a full stop landing at NMM. We confirm our intentions and are switched to tower once in sight of the field for a visual approach to 19R, which is later changed to 19L. John must like those last minute runway changes because he keeps getting them albeit without asking for them. ;)
We are advised of the arresting cable at 1400 feet past the arrival threshold and to "check wheels down." We confirm the information and make the approach to land AFTER the arresting gear.... We'll bring the carrier landing hook next time.
We taxi toward the MASH unit; two US Navy marshallers guide us to an open spot on the voluminous ramp. We are met quite ceremoniously by representatives of the US Public Health Service. The brief tour of the facility informs us that it was established from a pre-positioned hospital kit transported to the station to provide low-priority services, designed to take the pressure off of hospitals who need space for the care of more critical patients. There are few people here and this deployment is the first time it has been tried. Lessons are being learned, which is the good part.
Our passenger is a retired oil worker evacuated from the coast to this facility. He is being relocated to facilities in Birmingham. The case worker is quite glad that he will be leaving this facility for something much more suitable to his needs. He has been here for over two weeks. We are happy to make this happen, and glad to find out he had flown small aircraft and helicopters during his pre-retirement years. It's getting dark and this will be a one-hour night flight. We have plenty of fuel and expect that we will be staying in Birmingham for the night.
9:20 pm ET. We land at BHM. I walk toward the FBO and quickly locate the folks transporting our passenger from the airport to his new home. The transfer is made and it's time to consider what to do next. John and I are both boosted by the success of our day, and determine that a two hour flight to land in Wrens/Augusta again is practical, doable and safe. The prospects of a good night sleep in Birmingham are slim and the hotel availability an issue with so many people still relocated. We gas up and file the flight plan, and coordinate a few more plans with family in GA.
It's a long trip, but we manage to consider and dialog some lessons learned at the micro- and macro-policy levels across all of Alabama and much of GA. A weary approach controller is only too happy to receive our IFR cancellation at 1215 Monday morning, and we make the only approach into the airport - a visual one. There are no instrument approaches to Wrens, but we have the GPS and I put it into OBS mode to create an artificial extended center line for intercept and tracking. It works well. Considering that it's dark, late and the fatigue of having departed 17 hours ago is starting to creep into the picture, it's good to be down safely and headed for bed.
Cessna 182K N2871R performed flawlessly for the 9.5 hours of flight time that was recorded this particular 11 September. She would see us safely back to Leesburg the following day.
One mission accomplished.
NHC)In the wake of Hurricane Katrina ...
a group of health care professionals and pilots out of Atlanta called Operation Brother's Keeper formed to help bring relief to the homeless and stranded. This group was offering to transport families out of the destruction area to temporary housing offered by Vacation Rentals for Families. Considering my commercial pilot qualifications, I saw a way to use that skill to help. I signed up on the web page; the call to fly a mission came on Saturday morning, September 10th.
Working for a flight school, there are numerous resources available to choose from to make this flight. Considering that I do not personally own an airplane, I contact acquaintances that have access to airplanes that meet the mission requirements. My first call was to John Tabor, who has a share in a Cessna 182. Even though it is not a twin engine airplane, which was the preferred platform requested by the group, it is a more sufficient airplane for the mission at hand than the other training aircraft I normally fly. Upon calling John I learned that he had also signed up with OBK and had been waiting for a call that had not come yet. We decided to check with the logistic officers (spouses) for any un-considered issues and start formulating a plan. Having cleared the initial hurdles, we planned to leave that Saturday evening.
Departing Leesburg, John is ready. So am I.
John's parents live thirty miles outside of Augusta on the way to Atlanta, so overnight accommodations became a non-factor. John's parents live just three miles from the airport, which demonstrates the incredible flexibility and convenience that 5000 airports provide to the general aviation pilot. We left Leesburg, VA (JYO), made a planned stop in Concord, NC (JQF)at the two-hour mark for fuel and charts, and then flew to Wrens, GA (65J) to overnight there.
(View ahead over SW Virginia; there is not a cloud in the sky. One word: HAZE!)
Upon arriving and transferring meager luggage to the car left graciously by John's sister, we drive to the house and settle in for the night. The requisite 20 minutes of TWC (The Weather Channel) was absorbed, and then it was off to bed for an early Sunday morning. Despite the haze of the day before, the weather was looking good, and we awoke just after 6am to a beautiful, almost-autumn-like day.
(Sunrise over the wings - a busy day ahead.)
We were wheels up for the quick 50 minute, 109 mile flight to Dekalb (PDK) just before 8. About 15 miles from PDK, we were cleared for the VOR/DME RWY 27 circling 2R approach and switched to the tower before entering the procedure turn. We were instructed to make right traffic for runway 2R.
(Final approach to PDK).
Established on the ¾ mile final, we were asked to sidestep to 2L. John made that look easy.
(Short final)
Taxiing up to the staging area on the west ramp, we were greeted by the assignment coordinator and other pilots. We soon learned that the plan of the day was in development and that trucks with aid supplies would be arriving on the ramp mid-morning. Following a quick run to grab some post-flight breakfast we took some time to plan, assess fuel status, and get the plane ready for cargo. At 10:15 the truck arrived full of children's clothing, which works well for us since weight would end up being no factor, only space was the determining factor.
(Loaded.)
By just after 11, we were taxiing to depart for Hammond, LA, number 4 for takeoff. After a couple of quick vectors to the west, Atlanta approach cleared us direct to Hammond (HDC), which was fabulous - a 350NM great circle "straight" line. The flight was long enough to actually watch the GPS provide the DTK information to stay on the circle. Curiously, it wasn't until after we were cleared direct that the controller asked us where the airport was. Once we clarified it was in Louisiana, everything was quiet as we climbed up to 8000 feet. Prior to handoff to the next sector, the Atlanta controller took a moment to ask if we were taking supplies, and we replied that we had a full load of kids' clothes. The controller responded with his sincere “…thanks for all that you guys are doing to help out” and switched us to the Center frequency.
Considering the somewhat extra workload that slow GA airplanes add to a controllers' day, those words are high praise indeed.
As we get closer to Hammond, the haze starts to break and the blue tarps and scattered trees start to become visible as we descend. There is a temporary tower set up at Hammond and we report inbound 9NM NE.
(Final RWy 18; Army helo guards the fuel farm.)
After landing on RWY 18, we follow instructions to the west ramp. We see some familiar airplanes and decide where to park. In a few minutes, the truck and people to unload us gather around. The National guard provides some much appreciated bottled water for us. We are quickly unloaded and look to find out what is planned, or being planned for the rest of the day.
(Unloaded)
Now 2:30pm Central time. Other posts by pilots cover the next few two hours fairly well. The trip is a screaming success so far. At this point though, there are no passengers to take northeastward. After an hour of watching the call-a-thon to determine if any shelter has anyone in need of transport, I pick up the Angel Flight literature, which is right next to the Red Cross Hurricane Preparedness tri-fold brochure - how ironic. I call the number on the brochure at 3:20 pm CT on this Sunday, and someone answered the phone. I explained that we, and a whole bunch of assets were on the ground in Hammond, and wanted to know if there was anything that we could be used to do.
After about a half-dozen calls back and forth, I am informed that there is a mission from Naval Air Station Meridian, MS (NMM) to Birmingham, AL (BHM) to transport one person from the MASH unit to facilities in Birmingham. I am briefed for the mission and we start making plans to go. For those not familiar, it is rare to have permission to fly into a military facility, but our flight will use call sign "Angel-Flight-Seven-One-Romeo."
5:00pm, CT. Gas, flight plans, we are soon departing HDC RWY 18 for a northbound trek to NMM. After we climb out, we contact New Orleans departure to request and activate the IFR flight for NGF71R. Once again, we are cleared direct, and the GPS is programmed for the 90 minute flight. Meridian approach requests confirmation that we intend to make a full stop landing at NMM. We confirm our intentions and are switched to tower once in sight of the field for a visual approach to 19R, which is later changed to 19L. John must like those last minute runway changes because he keeps getting them albeit without asking for them. ;)
We are advised of the arresting cable at 1400 feet past the arrival threshold and to "check wheels down." We confirm the information and make the approach to land AFTER the arresting gear.... We'll bring the carrier landing hook next time.
We taxi toward the MASH unit; two US Navy marshallers guide us to an open spot on the voluminous ramp. We are met quite ceremoniously by representatives of the US Public Health Service. The brief tour of the facility informs us that it was established from a pre-positioned hospital kit transported to the station to provide low-priority services, designed to take the pressure off of hospitals who need space for the care of more critical patients. There are few people here and this deployment is the first time it has been tried. Lessons are being learned, which is the good part.
Our passenger is a retired oil worker evacuated from the coast to this facility. He is being relocated to facilities in Birmingham. The case worker is quite glad that he will be leaving this facility for something much more suitable to his needs. He has been here for over two weeks. We are happy to make this happen, and glad to find out he had flown small aircraft and helicopters during his pre-retirement years. It's getting dark and this will be a one-hour night flight. We have plenty of fuel and expect that we will be staying in Birmingham for the night.
9:20 pm ET. We land at BHM. I walk toward the FBO and quickly locate the folks transporting our passenger from the airport to his new home. The transfer is made and it's time to consider what to do next. John and I are both boosted by the success of our day, and determine that a two hour flight to land in Wrens/Augusta again is practical, doable and safe. The prospects of a good night sleep in Birmingham are slim and the hotel availability an issue with so many people still relocated. We gas up and file the flight plan, and coordinate a few more plans with family in GA.
It's a long trip, but we manage to consider and dialog some lessons learned at the micro- and macro-policy levels across all of Alabama and much of GA. A weary approach controller is only too happy to receive our IFR cancellation at 1215 Monday morning, and we make the only approach into the airport - a visual one. There are no instrument approaches to Wrens, but we have the GPS and I put it into OBS mode to create an artificial extended center line for intercept and tracking. It works well. Considering that it's dark, late and the fatigue of having departed 17 hours ago is starting to creep into the picture, it's good to be down safely and headed for bed.
Cessna 182K N2871R performed flawlessly for the 9.5 hours of flight time that was recorded this particular 11 September. She would see us safely back to Leesburg the following day.
One mission accomplished.
Saturday, August 06, 2005
$100 Lobster (Roll) Flight
Ken and I flew to Martha's Vineyard (MVY).
Our original mission profile was to obtain some famous NE Clam Chowdah, but we opted for the the special, too!
Tally Ho, Vihnyud 12 O'clock!
The Mooney likes gas... alot! But given the 180 knot TAS, I'm not complaining. Ken demonstrates proper pilot supervisory technique for the fill-up.
A quick shot of the terminal counter.
Some history of aviation at MVY.
The calf! (NE for cafeteria)
Block Island, NY at 9 o'clock, on the way back! Yes, that is an airport just past the inland bay area.
Total flight time round trip 5.0 hours; total cost... priceless.
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